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OEP/720 PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION
policy influenced exchange rates primarily through their effect on the perceived probability and timing of resumption. Section II presents a model of financial markets for the post-Civil War years in which the institutional peculiarities of the money supply process and the potential for resumption play important roles in exchange rate determination. The results of the model lend support to the historical accounts of Mitchell and Studenski and Krooss. Current or expected marginal changes in the supply of greenbacks have no effect on prices or exchange rates, while resumption expectations play a central role in determining the current exchange rate and price level. Resumption expectations imply expected future values of the exchange rate and price level. Government money-supply policy effectively pegs the nominal rate of interest and the equilibrium rate of expected inflation. The nominal money stock adjusts endogenously to the level demanded (through the issue of national bank notes, the creation of bank deposits, and gold flows) given the predetermined nominal interest rate and price level.
Section III provides evidence to support the assumptions and conclusions of the model, including evidence of the importance of fiscal policy news in short-and long-run exchange rate and price determination for the period of greenback suspension. OEP 
where NP is public holdings of national bank notes and GP is public holdings of greenbacks. The supply of total greenbacks is assumed fixed by the government.3 By definition:
where Gb is the banking sector's holdings of greenback reserves.4 2Table 1 provides some empirical evidence for the stability of the demand for paper bills. The ratio of real bills to real income (shown in column (9)) is nearly constant, and its variation over time is negatively correlated with that of interest rates (column (10)).
3 Our assumption of greenback supply exogeneity requires some qualification. Under the formula stipulated from January 1875 to May 1878 by Congress, total greenback supply responded to bank note supply such that greenbacks were reduced by $0.8 for every $1 of new bank notes. The supply of greenbacks, however, could not fall-below $300 million. Secretary Bristow interpreted this law to permit reductions in greenbacks as gross, rather than net, note issues rose. This regulation had no effect on the equilibrium supply of bills, since bank notes still could rise to adjust as needed. Thus this law does not affect the solution for equilibrium discussed below. ' State bank holdings of greenbacks or national bank notes as reserves against deposits are ignored in equations (2) and (3) because their inclusion would complicate, but not alter, any of our conclusions. State bank deposits were a small fraction of total deposits-$143 million out of $796 million total deposits in 1878 (see Studenski and Krooss (1963) , p. 177). National bank holdings of bank notes or greenbacks as reserves against deposits are also excluded from equations (2) and (3) for simplicity; moreover, since national banks which issued notes as well as deposits enjoyed economies of scope in reserve holdings it is unclear what the true marginal reserve cost of deposit supply would be. Thus the deposit reserve cost was less for national than for state banks, and similarly, the effective required reserves on notes were less than the legal reserve requirement i.
Greenbacks were not the only legal reserve for note issue; gold and interest-bearing legal tender notes were other options. From the standpoint of the model's solution, it is necessary to verify that greenbacks were the marginal reserve asset. To discover whether greenbacks were the marginal reservable asset one must check to see that: (1) required reserves for total notes issued exceeded the available supply of interest-bearing legal tender notes; and (2) required reserves for outstanding notes did not exceed the available supply of greenbacks plus interest-bearing legal tender. These are sufficient conditions because the order of opportunity OEP/724 PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION
Banks' note supply
The supply of national bank notes depended on the expected profitability of bank note issues. Banks which devoted a unit of capital to purchasing bonds as backing for notes earned dividends from government bonds purchased, less the cost of holding zero-interest greenback reserves and paying a 1 percent tax on notes outstanding. The supply function for national bank notes, given free entry, takes the form of a zero-economicprofit condition. The profit condition, derived in the Appendix, may be written:
where s is the real expected marginal profit rate banks earn from devoting capital to purchasing bonds in order to issue zero-interest bank notes, i expected inflation, t is the proportion of greenback reserves required relative to notes issued, and i, is the expected return to bank loans.5 s is given exogeneously by alternative uses of bank capital. The profit rate reflects (the inverse of) the amount of capital one must devote to the purchase of bonds (L), the yield earned on government bonds (0b), the opportunity cost of holding greenback reserves on bank notes [(0.9-r)ij], and the federal tax on bank note issues [0.009]. The coefficient 0.9 on the greenback reserve cost term reflects a 111 percent bond reserve requirement, and the 0.009 tax cost reflects a 1 percent federal tax on national bank notes, again multiplied by the note-to-bond reserve ratio. 5 The relevant il is the lowest il among banks eligible to issue notes, since banks competed nationally in supplying notes. Legal requirements ranged between 5 percent and 25 percent depending on the date and location of the bank. Initially, only New York banks were required to keep the full 25 percent reserves; other cities' banks had a small effective reserve requirement of 12.5 percent; country banks had an even smaller requirement of 6 percent. In June 1874 reserve requirements were lowered for all banks to 5 percent. Presumably the true costs of holding greenback reserves were less than that indicated in equation (4), since superfluous reserves on bank notes would allow national banks to reduce reserves they would otherwise hold against deposits.
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Steady-state equilibrium We solve for the steady state where prices adjust fully and real output is predetermined in factor markets (y = ). 6 Let the real rate of interest in the private bond market be determined exogeneously by international productive opportunities and time preference rob = rpbFor simplicity, assume that the real return on bank loans r1 equals the real rate on bonds, due to arbitrage between bank and bond finance. Abstracting from risk differentials, r1 = rpb.
Banks were not the sole holders of reservable bonds. As Cagan (1965) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) point out, this holds throughout the period of greenback suspension. In this case, the real rate of return on bonds used as reserves for bank notes is governed by arbitrage across bond markets and is exogeneous to the supply and demand of bank notes. Thus, abstracting once again from risk differentials, rb = -rpb Rewrite equation ( 
This terminal condition for the price level, together with the equilibrium rate of inflation from (5), determines a unique price path P, recursively. Given xr, G, (BIP)*, and P, we can solve for B, and N, as well. Thus expectations are crucial for determining the levels of nominal variables. Note that changes in G have no effect on the equilibrium time path of price or the exchange rate. The time paths of the price level and the exchange rate instead depend crucially on the probability of parity resumption and its timing. As the likelihood of parity resumption rises or as events occur which lead people to anticipate that resumption will happen sooner than they had previously expected, the price level will fall. Political news of changes in resumption policy, or changes in fiscal policy which affect the ability or the costliness of the government's resuming would influence the current exchange rate and price level.9 9 In order to verify that our equilibrium solution is appropriate we must make sure that the equilibrium values we derive do not lead to contradictions of our assumptions. The first condition to verify is the bondholder arbitrage condition. This is only relevant if the public is holding some of the bonds used by banks as reserves-that is, if banks are not holding all government bonds as required backing for bank notes. Implicitly we have assumed that: The intuition for the result that the price level is independent of greenback supply is that so long as an endogenous perfect substitute (bank notes) exists for nominal greenbacks on the margin, the nominal supply of greenbacks will have no effect on the nominal equilibrium supply of total bills, and hence will have no effect on the time path of the price level. This is illustrated in Fig. 4 Another counterfactual caveat to our equilibrium arises from the potentially binding constraint that the total supply of greenbacks poses for the supply of national bank notes. In other words, our solution implicitly requires that, at each point in time, N* <-.
Otherwise, the public holds no greenbacks and the requirement that banks redeem bank notes in greenbacks on request implies only a one-sided arbitrage condition: The price level denominated in greenbacks (P9) must be greater than or equal to the price level denominated in bank notes (P'): pg ? pr'.
In this case, B G
Now the equilibrium rate of expected inflation, the time path of B* and the condition EP = 1 would be used to solve recursively for PF in order to satisfy the real demand for bills. As before, this caveat is irrelevant to the history of greenback suspension, because the public always held greenbacks as well as bank notes (see Table 1 ).
A final counterfactual caveat involves the non-negativity constraint on national bank notes. If N* = 0 then B* = G. In this case, one would solve recursively for the time path of price and inflation given EPX and the demand function for real bills. 10 In principle, changes in the supply of greenbacks could influence expectations of government resumption policy (and hence, the current exchange rate) by altering the potential gain to the government from default. Empirical evidence reported below, however, does not support such a connection between greenback issues and exchange rates. OEP/728 PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION Adding the demands for gold and deposits to the model In addition to bills, the public held deposits and used gold for foreign transactions, domestic transactions (especially in California), and potentially for portfolio diversification. Write the demand for gold as:
where C is the gold holdings of the public, id is the interest rate earned on deposits, and f is the expected rate of greenback depreciation relative to gold. The demand functions for bills and deposits Q take the form: As before, in order to solve for B*, N*, and P* one must incorporate price expectations from equation (11). C* and Q* are derived solely from the demand equations and the assumption of perfectly elastic gold and deposit supplies (i.e., exogenous real interest rates).
Forming price expectations under uncertainty
When resumption is uncertain agents update their beliefs about the timing and likelihood of resumption as news emerges of changes in the government's ability or willingness to resume convertibility.
What would have determined the value of greenbacks if the government had announced a credible policy of never returning to any maintained parity? To the extent that this event had a positive probability, the potential purely fiduciary value of greenbacks was relevant for their current value. In the context of our model, without an expectation of a future price level, the current price level is indeterminate, because the total supply of bills is endogenous. Additional assumptions regarding the behavior of the government under a fiduciary regime are necessary to solve this indeterminacy problem.
A simple solution to this probelm is to posit a target price path under the potential fiduciary regime, to which all other government policy instruments would adjust. For simplicity, assume the fiduciary target path would be Pt= P for all time. As long as P> 1, expectations of a quicker or more likely return to maintained parity would lead today to currency appreciation and price deflation. Assuming resumption is expected to occur, or not to occur, at time x, the expectation at time t of the price level at time x is the probability weighted sum of par value and the fiduciary price level:
where d is the probability of resumption, and P > EPX > 1. Under risk neutrality, to arrive at the current price level P0 one solves for the price path recursively from EoPx using the value of Sire derived from equation (5):
"News" which implies quicker expected resumption (a reduction in x), a higher probability of resumption, or a lower expected fiduciary price level, all reduce the price level today:
Po=Z(a,x,P); Z1<O,Z2,Z3>O-
III. Empirical evidence
My empirical efforts to verify the applicability of the model presented in Section II to the period of greenback suspension divide in two: first, to evaluate some of the assumptions which underlie the model; second, to provide evidence in support of the connection between expectations of appreciation and the perceived long-run backing of the currency.
Verifying the assumptions of the model
Among the important assumptions of the model in Section II are: (1) free entry in bank note supply (2) the efficiency of asset markets; and (3) the " An extension of the model would be to consider the behavior of risk-averse agents, for whom higher moments of probability distributions would be relevant. If agents were risk-averse, for example, mean-preserving increases in the variance of density functions for the timing of resumption and the fiduciary equilibrium price would reduce the current value of greenbacks relative to gold (and commodities). Risk aversion is potentially important for understanding the portfolio demand for gold in an equilibrium with expected deflation. The findings of Roll (1972) and those discussed below suggest that deflation was expected, and we know gold was held by many agents, though one might argue that foreign transactions and California regulations, rather than risk-aversion, were at the heart of the demand for gold. Gold was required to pay interest on coin-paying bonds, to pay duties, for foreign trade, and for transactions in California (see Lester (1939) Our model assumes an endogenous, competitively supplied level of national bank notes; yet national banks did not come into existence until 1863 and a nominal ceiling of $300 million was placed on bank note supply initially. Once that amount had been subscribed, no more notes could be issued. As Dewey (1903) shows, the aggregate note ceiling was a binding constraint through 1870, though legislated regional distribution guidelines were never enforced.12 The raising of the note ceiling constraint in July 1870 to $354 million rendered the ceiling irrelevant until it was eliminated altogether in January 1875. Still, from 1867 until 1870 the $300 million ceiling on notes, together with the supply of greenbacks, fixed the supply of nominal bills (see Fig. 2 ). The effective ceiling on notes until July 1870 made greenbacks supply a binding constraint on total bills. Potentially, this could have exerted an important influence on nominal variables.
Analyzing the effect of the supply of greenbacks on the price level and exchange rate for the period 1862-1866 is difficult because the supply function for state bank notes and their substitutability with greenbacks would have to be specified, as well as the peculiarities of the initial period of adjustment in national bank note supply from 1864 to 1867. Instead I focus on the period from 1867 on.
How does the $300 million national bank note ceiling change the solution for the equilibrium time path of price for 1867 to 1870? The solution depends on whether agents anticipate the relaxation of the note supply constraint. Suppose first that they do. Then from the time the constraint is relaxed, t1 to time x, the equilibrium is as before. From the initial moment to t1, one solves for the time path of price recursively using the price level at t1 as the starting point. The at t1 is the (higher) rate of expected inflation consistent with N (the note ceiling), the price level at ti, and the real bills demand function.
Note that equation (6) no longer determines -re; in the presence of the note ceiling, competition among banks for providing notes does not occur. Instead equation (6) rate of seigniorage on note issues is difficult to measure directly. First, the calculation depends crucially on the measured opportunity cost to banks in the loan market, which James (1976) argues varied greatly across regions. Second, the extent of leveraging of bank capital in bond purchasing by banks is crucial and unclear. Third, there may be invisible costs or benefits to banks from issuing notes. Finally, effective reserve requirements varied depending on the location of the bank and its reserve-to-deposit ratio. These issues are discussed in the Appendix.
Calomiris ( ceiling were expected to persist, then one would solve in the same manner for the time path of price recursively from P, rather than P1. Under the binding note ceiling expectations of resumption remain an essential component of the solution for the price level and exchange rate through their effect on ?x and P., but the price and exchange rate paths from time zero to the time the ceiling is relaxed also will depend on the inital exogenous level of bills supplied. The level of nominal notes initially supplied, along with P., determine the equilibrium rate of seigniorage, and therefore, the rate of inflation.
One way to measure the importance of the ceiling's effect on the time path of price from 1867 to 1870 is to compare short-run expected rates of inflation before 1870 with those afterward. If the ceiling was important, expected rates of inflation should have been higher before 1870 than after.
No comparable short-term yields on gold-and greenback-denominated securities exist from which to derive inflation expectations. Actual annual inflation and greenback depreciation for 1867 through 1878 are provided in Table 2 . Though ex post data may be poor indicators of the relevant ex ante series, to the extent that annual inflation and depreciation were foreseen, Table 2 suggests that expected inflation or greenback depreciation was not rates follow a random walk, then short-run innovations in exchange rates have a permanent effect. It follows that the "random" component of the exchange rate series reflects "fundamentals" of short-and long-run exchange rate determination. Variables which reflect important news of long-run interest should be correlated with these unpredictable short-run changes in exchange rates. Roll (1972) shows that partial autocorrelations among innovations in weekly and monthly gold/greenback exchange rates provide evidence in favor of a random walk, and therefore, market efficiency. In order further to test market efficiency I regress-using end-of-month data-the natural log of the exchange rate on its lagged value and test the residuals of the regression for autocorrelation. The random walk specification is a more restrictive one, because it constrains the coefficient on the lagged term to be unity.
ARIMA identification procedures suggest either an AR(1) process or a random walk. As Table 3 shows, the estimated coefficients for the AR(1) specification are very close to unity. Furthermore, differencing does not produce strong negative first order serial correlation of errors. Together, these results indicate that the series is probably best described as a random walk. Results are reported for both specifications in Tables 3 and 4 . The regression equations and significance levels for partial autocorrelation tests of the residuals are described in Table 3 . These tests confirm the efficiency hypothesis. No significant seasonality or moving average process is evident in monthly exchange rate movements. Partial autocorrelations are given in International determination of commodity gold prices For our steady-state model to be applied to short-run price movements two strong assumptions regarding commodity price determination must be satisfied: first, that prices adjust quickly to shocks which alter the equilibrium price level; and second, that world gold prices are homogenous 14Friedman and Schwartz recognize the influence of expectations on bond prices. Furthermore, they realize that given the high gold yields on bonds, there is evidence that bond dealers expected a rise in the gold value of greenbacks (pp. 72-74). Why then did they not include these expectations in their analysis of greenback valuation? On this point, Friedman and Schwartz are silent except for the comment that "the purchasers of government securities were a much more mixed and broader group than the speculators in foreign exchange were, so we are dealing with the expectations of two very different groups" (Friedman and Schwartz, p. 73, footnote 82). Roll (1972) across countries within narrow bandwidths of autonomous domestic variation which result from information and transaction costs. The bandwidths must be narrow in the sense that most price variation-especially persistent large price changes-is governed by common international factors. Before summarizing the evidence which supports these assumptions it is worth emphasizing that neither short-run price flexibility nor common international commodity gold prices is a crucial assumption for the main conclusion of our model-that long-run price level movements are determined by policy expectations rather than by exogenous money supply innovations. If we relax these two assumptions-allow prices to adjust sluggishly and assume an exogenously-determined domestic supply of gold, instead of international price arbitrage to which the supply of gold is endogenous-our long-run equilibrium would be different only in the role played by the fixed supply of gold. Fiscal news still would fix exchange rates, while the price level would be influenced by exchange rate changes as well as the level of gold supply.
In support of the assumption of rapid price adjustment, one can appeal to the relative homogeneity of commodities in the nineteenth century and the relative absence of labor market contracting. Using monthly data for 1879 through 1914, Calomiris and Hubbard (1986) find evidence of rapid adjustment of prices, relative to output, to shocks which affect both price and output over the course of the business cycle-the reverse of the standard result for post-World War II data. These results confirm those in Sachs (1980) 
and DeLong and Summers (1984).
Calomiris and Hubbard (1987) present evidence of two kinds in favor of elastic gold flows and common short-run international determination of commodity gold prices for the period 1879 to 1914. ARIMA models and event studies indicate that perturbations in the demand for gold are resolved within approximately three months. Tariff-adjusted price ratios for sugar, wheat and cotton yield estimated transaction-cost bandwidths of approximately 10 percent of traded goods prices in both the short and long runs. These results indicate that short-run variations in commodity prices mainly reflect rapid, common international adjustment and that full adjustment occurs rapidly.'5 15 For convenience, the model of Section II carries the assumption of common international gold prices a step farther to the assumption of common gold-price levels, or "purchasing power parity (PPP)." In the real world, of course, changes in the composition of consumption and investment goods will alter the price deflator relevant for asset demand equations even when individual commodity prices are constant. Moreover, nontraded goods may not bear as close a relation to one another across countries as traded goods, though McCloskey and Zecker (1985) argue nontraded goods prices should be linked by common factor costs. The upshot of these considerations is that in empirical work one would expect to find persistent deviations, or drift over time, in a PPP index, which reflects the changing composition of goods, and the bandwidths of autonomous domestic variation. This qualification of the model in Section II implicitly is included in the empirical model reported below. The domestic price equation is estimated in log first-differences with foreign price terms on the right-hand side. In addition, several lagged domestic price terms which appear on the right-hand side could approximate an MA(1) process in domestic price change, which would allow drift over time in the PPP index.
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Evidence from reduced-form vector autoregressive (VAR) models confirms that unpredictable changes in price indexes are highly correlated between the U.S. and Britain, and that full adjustment of U.S. or British price levels to simulated shocks originating in the other country's prices essentially takes place within six months. Calomiris (1985, chapter 3) finds, for the period 1867 through 1878, that the correlation between monthly unpredictable wholesale price inflation in Britian and the U.S. ranges from 0.3 to 0.4 depending on the variables included in the forecasting equations.
Testing the predictions of the model
The model of Section II implies that news relevant for movements in exchange rates and prices primarily involves expectations of future government policy. Here I present evidence of three kinds in support of the importance of fiscal news: first, evidence from securities markets that changing perceptions of the long-run specie value of greenbacks were linked to expectations of resumption; second, exchange rate data on the value of greenbacks relative to government money with different backing (the old demand notes); third, evidence from a vector autoregressive model which shows that government bond "funding" policy was an important element of news in exchange rate determination.
Expected appreciation: evidence from bond-market yields
According to equation (4), the equilibrium expected rate of deflation and currency appreciation is given by expected real rates of return in financial markets, marginal reserve requirements, the tax on bank note issues, and the degree of capital leveraging in note issuing. This suggests that the long-run pattern of exchange-rate appreciation and price deflation should have been largely anticipated, and that forecast errors in long-run expected inflation should be related to news about the timing and likelihood of resumption, since actual appreciation is the sum of predictable smooth changes in the exchange rate and unpredictable leaps related to news.
Evidence in support of deflationary expectations comes from comparisons of yields on greenback-and gold-denominated securities. Interest differentials between bonds which paid in greenbacks and those which paid in gold were negative, which implies an expected capital gain on greenbackdenominated principal. Roll (1972) reports this result for the Civil War years, using government securities of similar maturity denominated in greenbacks and coin for comparison.'6 16There is some question regarding the extent to which Roll is able to attribute differences in interest rates to differences in the numeraire of the securities. Whether before 1869 government bonds were seen as gold-denominated ex ante is a subject of debate. Roll claims that his observed yield differentials provide evidence for a perceived difference in numeraire. He recognizes, however, that there are alternative interpretations of his results and that, therefore, interest rate differences may reflect other factors in addition to expectations of exchange rate changes (e.g., a premium related to the relative riskiness of greenbackdenominated securities). For the later period, no comparable greenback-denominated government bonds exist for comparison. Yields on low-risk, greenback-denominated railroad bonds and coin-denominated government bonds *are available, however, though time varying default risk differentials and splicing of different railroads' yields introduce potential errors into the measurement of expected deflation. Calomiris (1985, chapter 3) constructs a measure of expected appreciation, under the assumption of constant default risk differentials among government bonds and highest-quality railroad bonds of similar maturity, for the period from 1869 to 1878, when the redemption of government bond principal in gold was a virtual certainty.'7
OEP/738 PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION
The risk-adjusted yield differential thus calculated (reported in Table 5) indicates a consistent expectation of appreciation throughout the period. Expected and actual greenback appreciation are close for much of the period. Of course, whenever imputed expected appreciation is greater than actual, this reflects either time-varying default risk or measurement error, since no one would have expected appreciation beyond the parity level. There is a slight negative trend in the imputed forecast error series (column (4) of Table 5 ) which may reflect peculiarities in the splicing of the series, or an unpredictable trend in policy.'8 The large value of 1.53 in column (4) for the first half of 1869 is consistent with the fact that 1869 was a turning point in the government's commitment to the redemption of bond principal in gold. Most of the subsequent entries in column (4) are relatively close to zero, which indicates that deflationary expectations were generally accurate, and the risk premium differential was fairly constant.
The large negative value of -1.49 for early 1876 is consistent with Unger's (1964) description of the political controversy and consequent forecast error regarding the future of resumption policy prior to the election of 1876. The first half of 1876 was the time of greatest challenge to the timely resumption of specie convertibility stipulated by the Resumption Act of 1875. The Democrats were divided between "hard"-and "soft"-money advocates. The desire to maintain party unity and to attract soft-money independents led to a tolerance of the soft-money minority in the Democrat-controlled Congress. Repeated attempts by soft-money Democrats to force consideration of the repeal of the Resumption Act prior to the election were thwarted by procedural rules and then finally by the nomination of the hard-money candidate Tilden. The repeal movement failed to force the issue prior to the election in an attempt to extract a price for party unity. Tilden's empty promises to postpone resumption and a party platform pledging the same were not viewed as credible commitments. The nomination of Tilden in July had effectively put to rest any true threat of a postponement of resumption. Even the house bill calling for postponement which passed August 5, 1876 was nothing more than a political ploy; it was kept vague deliberately and passed with a vote of 106 to 86, with 93 abstentions.
The old demand notes
Further evidence that the current specie value of greenbacks and other assets reflected expectations of resumption policy and long-run backing comes from Mitchell (1903) . To bolster his argument that exchange rates were governed by fiscal news, Mitchell cites exchange rates between the demand notes of 1861 and the greenbacks of 1862. The demand notes were identical to the greenbacks in every respect, except that they were OEP/740 PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION acceptable for the payment of customs duties at par with gold, while greenbacks were not. Mitchell notes that this special tariff-backing allowed the demand notes to trade at a premium relative to greenbacks, as shown in Table 6 . It is important to note that tariff backing was not immediate; until all demand notes had been paid in, agents had to value demand notes based on expectations of par valuation with gold, since not all demand notes could be redeemed immediately in payment of duties. Thus it was expected backing that distinguished demand notes from greenbacks.'9
Debt funding policy as news
The conversion in the late 1860s of short-term paper-denominated government debt into long-term funded securities denominated in coin substantially reduced the potential benefit to the government of depreciating the currency. In mid-1865 government debt was split roughly evenly between obligations payable in lawful money and those payable only in coin. By mid-1867 coin-denominated securities out-numbered paper securities more than three to one, and by mid-1869 interest-bearing debt denominated in legal tender was less than 3 percent of total debt. There was some initial doubt regarding the government's intention to repay the principal of its coin-denominated debt in specie, but this was resolved in early 1869 when a combination of actual principal payments in specie, legislation mandating payment in specie, and a Supreme Court ruling made Because demand note supply was less than the sum of future tariff payments, the parity of gold and demand notes in payment of duties created a market parity between the two through arbitrage. The discounting of demand notes probably reflects the possibility of a future change in tariff payment parity. This discount explains why the demand notes were used instead of gold in payment of duties until their supply was exhausted. For more discussion of tax arbitrage constraints see Adam Smith (1776), p. 311; and Calomiris (1985) . it clear that the principal of coin-denominated debt would not be paid with depreciated paper.20
Given the credibility of government debt repayment in coin and the reduction in the incentive to depreciate the currency which came from the changing debt composition, it follows that unanticipated changes in the composition of government debt may have been perceived as a component of news regarding the likelihood and timing of resumption. By reducing the amount of greenback-denominated debt, and consequently its incentive to depreciate the currency, the government may have signaled its intentions to redeem greenbacks in gold.
In order to investigate this proposition, I construct a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to measure the contributions of unpredictable changes in government debt composition and other variables in explaining movements in exchange rates, prices, and monetary aggregates.21 20The fact that the government always paid interest on bonds in gold and redeemed bond principal in gold ten years before greenback resumption indicates strong preferential treatment for bondholders. A reason for discrimination by the government in favour of bondholders over currencyholders may be that the bond market is a more competitive forum for funding. That is, if bondholders have access to many government bond issues, governments with poor reputations will find they face high interest costs, and perhaps, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983 ) would suggest, increasing quantity constraints in bond markets. Thus there are strong incentives for a government to maintain its reputation among bondholders. If the elasticities of substitution between a government's currency issues and other media of exchange are smaller, the government may wish to ensure bond redemption first, and in some instances may even choose not to redeem currency when it has the ability to do so.
In their recent paper, "Suspension and the Financing of the Civil War: A Critique of Newcomb and Mitchell" (1984), Rolnick and Wallace conjecture that resumption expectations may have depended only on overall government fiscal expectations and, hence, suspension may have constituted only a change in numeraire relative to government finance without suspension but with the same overall fiscal uncertainty. I take exception to this view because it fails to distinguish between government commitments to bondholders and fiduciary currencyholders during and after the War. History often distinguished between the two. For example, bondholders received full value for their assets after the Revolution, whereas moneyholders received 1 percent of the promised value of their paper assets. Hammond (1961) suggests that some of the original motivation for issuing notes to finance the Civil War was to prevent losses to holders of outstanding bonds. Bankers on the whole supported the issuing of greenbacks, though it is not clear whether they did so as a means to enhance liquidity or to protect the value of their bond holdings.
21 Mitchell (1903 Mitchell ( , 1908 and Thompson (1972) compare actual fluctuations in the specie value of greenbacks with events they define as news. Mitchell claims that a variety of items constituted news relevant for resumption expectations: information on battles, government fiscal policy, and Treasury reports. He rejects the quantity theory approach to prices and exchange rates citing the endogeneity of money and the lack of correspondence between money and prices. He challenges what would now be called the elasticities approach to exchange rates and claims that " ... the supply and demand for gold, instead of controlling were themselves controlled by the premium." He understands interest rate arbitrage and the consequent importance of London interest rates. Perhaps most important, Mitchell emphasizes that greenbacks were the liability of the government and that their value was determined as that of any private liability-by the credibility of the issuer.
Greenbacks were notes of the government of the U.S., and as such their value-like the value of the notes of a private person-depended on the credit of the issuer. If confidence in the government's ability ultimately to redeem its notes had been entirely destroyed, the C. W. CALOMIRIS OEP/743 I include the following monthly data series in the reduced-form model: the exchange rate; the U.S. wholesale price index; the British wholesale price index; Frickey's (1947) production index for communication and transportation; total government debt net of gold in the Treasury; the ratio of coin-to greenback-denominated debt; deposits of banks in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia; the interest rate on double-name choice commercial paper; the outstanding stock of greenbacks; and the outstanding stock of national bank notes.22 Given the random-walk character of nominal variables, the model is estimated in first-differences. All variables enter as first-differences of logarithms except the commerical paper rate and the ratio of coin-to greenback-denominated debt which enter as simple differences.
The estimation equations derive series of predicted values and shocks for each variable using six lags of each endogenous variable and monthly dummies for the period 1867 through 1878. In simulation, the system of equations is solved simultaneously to derive the percentage contribution of shocks from each variable to the forecast variance of the others and the responses of all variables to shocks which originate in each series. Both the decomposition of forecast variance and the response patterns to shocks depend on assigning the estimated residuals-which are correlated across variables-to particular variables in the system. The orthogonalization of contemporaneous shocks that one chooses may alter, for example, the relative percentage contribution of one variable's disturbances to another's forecast variance.
I assign the following order of priority among residuals: greenbacks (DLG), outstanding net debt (DLNET), the ratio of coin-to greenbackdenominated debt (DRINC), the exchange rate (DLEX), the commercial paper rate (DCPR), the U.S. wholesale price index (DLWP), deposits (DLDEP), national bank notes (DLN), production (DLPROD), and the British price index (DLUK). This ordering reflects the fact that initial note supply adjustment took longer than a month (due to bond purchase and note delivery lags), as well as the view that asset prices respond to common shocks before commodity prices, and the desire to place greenbacks supply and fiscal news prior to the exchange rate in order to measure the impact of innovations in these series on the exchange rate.23 Varying the relative order of monetary aggregates, price indexes, the interest rate, and the exchange rate has little effect on the simulation results discussed below. Table 7 reports F-tests of the inclusion of a variable's lagged values in each predicting equation, the correlation matrix of residuals, and the forecast variance decomposition for each variable. Only the long-run (forty-month) forecast variance decomposition is reported, but typically six-month decompositions are close to the forty-month figures because convergence to long-run responses occurs rapidly.
The high marginal significance levels for F-tests in the exchange rate equation supports the random-walk hypothesis of exchange rate movements. The government debt ratio proves to be one of the most important determinants of exchange rate movements;,unpredictable innovations in this series lead to reductions in the exchange rate and price level; they explain 8.56 percent of the forecast variance of the exchange rate, and 8.03 percent of the forecast variance of the price level. Another important influence on the exchange rate is unpredictable changes in the production index. One way to explain their importance is as an indicator of prosperity, and hence, increased government budget surpluses.
Exchange rate disturbances prove a relatively significant and important determinant of wholesale prices, deposits and bank notes, which is consistent with the theoretical view of the exchange rate as the nominal anchor of the system. In contrast, shocks to money are unimportant for the determination of the exchange rate or price level. The high correlation (0.39) between disturbances in U.S. and British wholesale prices and the 23 In order to issue notes banks had first to purchase and deposit bonds and await the delivery of the government-printed bank notes. Complaints frequently were made of bureaucratic delays. See Unger (1964) DLG = greenbacks DLNET = government debt net of Treasury gold DRINC = ratio of gold-to greenback-denominated debt (differenced) DLEX = exchange rate DCPR = commercial paper rate DLWP = U.S. wholesale price index DLDEP = bank deposits at New York, Philadelphia, and Boston DLN = national bank notes DLPROD = U.S. production index DLUK = constructed British wholesale price index instance, the threat of British entry in the War due to the Trent Affair, the bad fiscal news of Chase's Report of December 1861, Chase's proposal to remedy the fiscal crisis by regulating the banking system, and the fact that the bad fiscal news came at a time when banks held large inventories of government loans, together led to the need for banks-and then the government-to suspend specie parity.25 Similarly, it was the sound fiscal footing on which the government had placed itself by 1878 that made attempted resumption credible and successful.26
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APPENDIX: MEASURING RENTS FROM NOTE ISSUES
In his 1873 Annual Report, the Comptroller of the Currency, John Jay Knox, published calculations of the profitability to national banks from buying bonds and issuing notes during the suspension. Knox estimated profits at between 1 and 2' percent, depending on which region the bank was located. Knox noted that banks suffer an additional loss due to the difference between the market and face values of the bond at the date of maturity, but he did not include this in his calculation. In paper terms, one can write the ex ante profit rate to maturity per unit of bond purchase as: 
where Y is the nominal annual yield to maturity on government bonds, i, is the long-run yield on alternative uses of capital, and r is the proportional greenback reserve requirement on notes. The 0.9 coefficient reflects the 111 percent ratio of bond reserves to notes, while the -0.009 intercept reflects the 1 percent federal tax per year on notes outstanding. Government bonds were payable in coin rather than paper, but given that government bonds were not being held only by banks, arbitrage kept the real yield on government bonds close to that of other bonds, adjusting for default risk. Thus one can use paper railroad bond yields, adjusted for default risk, to derive ex ante paper yields on government bonds (see Calomiris, 1985) . Cagan (1965) modifies this approach to calculating the profitability of note issue. As Cagan points out, if banks can buy more bonds rather than make loans with the notes they receive initially, and issue further notes on these bonds, then the rate of return on note issuing should be taken as a ratio of bank capital diverted, not as a ratio of the total amount invested in bonds. Cagan (1965, 
